1971 War: Planning for Operations III

[Deletedid1]

Part I :  [url=http://andhrafriends.com/index.php?topic=140128.msg1582404#msg1582404]http://andhrafriends.com/index.php?topic=140128.msg1582404#msg1582404[/url]
Part II:  [url=http://andhrafriends.com/index.php?topic=140420.msg1586655#msg1586655]http://andhrafriends.com/index.php?topic=140420.msg1586655#msg1586655[/url]

Two outstanding political leaders were at the helm of affairs in 1971 and any account of the 1971 war would be incomplete without complimenting them. First and fore­most was Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi whose ability to appraise complex situations, identify major problems and define clear-cut lines of action was exceptional. The second was Mr Jagjivan Ram, who held the office of Defence Minister with distinction from 1969 to 1973, who ably supported her.

As Chief of Air Staff during this period, I had the privilege of seeing him work at close quarters: he was a model of what I imagine a Minister should be. He had complete confidence in the Chiefs of Staff and his secretaries; he was unambiguous in making known Government’s aims and intentions and, having done that, left it to the people concerned to get on with the job. He was cool, unflustered, quick-witted, cheerful, with a sense of humour and he did not talk down to people.


The Chiefs were kept in constant touch with developments in the subcontinent and what the Cabinet was thinking about them. There was full and free exchange of ideas amongst the Chiefs. The period of watching and waiting, from 26 March to 3 December was well spent during which the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the inter- Service Committees, the Service Head­quarters and the Ministry of Defence worked in a smooth and coordinated manner. The armed forces were therefore as well prepared as they could be when Pakistani aircraft attacked our airfields on the evening of 3 December 1971.

When talking about planning for war, one tends to think in terms of Staff College exercises for set situations, of the several factors that have to be taken into account and of preparation of a plan of action, a suggested plan of action, which shows every sign of being successful. The whole exercise is cut and dry. It is rather an exercise in logical thinking than in actually fighting a war. When it finally comes to fighting a war, one is faced with imponderables and unknown factors, with situations that cannot be foreseen in advance. The princi­pal question, of course, is how the likely enemy is going to behave. Intelligence can make some intelligent guesses no doubt, so can the Commanders of the opposing forces, but it is virtually impossible to establish with any certainty precisely what the opponent is going to do, where he is going to do it, or how, or when. So, in planning for operations, one has to be prepared to meet a variety of contingencies, not the least of which is that the most unexpected thing is likely to happen.

In the 1971 war, this was demonstrated time and again. To begin with, the information coming in from newspapers, from foreign correspondents, and all other open information indi­cated a considerable buildup of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan. At the same time, it was obvious that preparations for war were going ahead in the West. Gen Yahya Khan made no secret of it. In fact, every few weeks he made some pro­nouncement or the other to the effect that unless India behaved itself, stayed out of the mess that he was making in East Pakistan, he would have to teach India a lesson. All the information we had indicated that he was preparing for pre­cisely that, to punish us in the West as a counter to his own troubles in East Pakistan.

However, the full scale of such preparations could only be guessed. We could not arrive at any clear estimate of what exactly he was planning to do, where he would attack and with what forces. Bengali officers and men fleeing from the Pak armed forces came into India with reports that confirmed these suspicions, but their information was disjointed and scrappy for none of them had held positions in which they could have had a hand in the framing of operational plans. Those Bengalis who did hold positions of responsibility in the Pak armed forces were presumably locked up, in West Pakistan and in the East, for not many of them come across.

We got a picture of a discontent, of the disturbances in the East, the desertions from the Pakistani forces of Bengali officers and men in the West, but it was hardly a sufficient basis on which to draw up a sound plan. Inevitably, therefore, while proceeding with whatever information that came our way from open sources and from intelligence, the plans of the Armed Forces in India had to be revised and updated.

A crucial factor that had to be considered was the timing of the operation. If Pakistan decided to attack during the monsoon season, then the areas in which it could possibly do so would be limited. The activity that we could undertake in East Pakistan would also be limited because of the fact that the rivers would be swollen, ground would be marshy, the rice fields would be full of water and it would be virtually impossi­ble for our transports to move. In the West the effect of the monsoon is not quite so great, but it would limit the area of operation to relatively dry land, to operating on main roads and highways and perhaps in the desert. If the Pakistanis launched their attacks after the monsoon, in the autumn, then the scenario changes, and the disposition of our forces would have to match the changed scenario both in the East and the West.

The likelihood of a war in winter, when the passes are snowbound and Chinese help unlikely to be so easily forthcom­ing to Pakistan, was yet another possibility that had to be considered. The Chinese could come in at any time before the passes along the northern border became snowbound; but they could not come in winter. So again the disposition of our forces to meet the threat from Pakistan and the possible threat from China, had to be considered and provided for.