TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON - III: COLD START

[Deletedid1]

[b]TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON - II: CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETERRENCE[/b]

Sadia Tasleem
Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
email: [email protected]

Credible Minimum Deterrence is a highly loaded term, often used to suggest a state’s intentions with regard to its nuclear posture. Combined, the three words, ‘Credible’, ‘Minimum’ and ‘Deterrence’ present a complex paradox. Credibility, for instance, is an essential prerequisite for deterrence. Why then use the word 'credible' as a prefix to Deterrence or Minimum Deterrence?

Yet, another challenge arises from the apparently convoluted nature of messages that 'credible' and 'minimum' convey. While ‘minimum’ suggests “the least required to deter the adversary;” adding 'credible' to it blurs the whole idea. Since credibility largely depends upon the adversary’s perception of our capabilities and intentions, there is always the possibility of incorrectly assessing our credibility in the adversary’s calculations. Caution in such circumstances may necessitate preparation for the worst possible scenario, thus raising the ‘minimum’ bar. As a result what would appear credible might not be ‘minimum’.

Why do then states opt to use terms that send across obscure signals? What shapes their particular choice of terms? And what do they actually mean by these terms? These are important questions to be addressed while we strive to untangle the complexities of a common lexicon. This paper attempts to explain possible causes behind the idea of prefixing both ‘minimum’ and ‘credible’ to deterrence. (Identifying the right causes for a state might also help us clearly define what a state means by minimum and credible).

Why ‘minimum’?
i. To set a ceiling out of sheer sense of moral responsibility
ii. A genuine commitment to keep the arsenal low (either because it is cost-  effective or because a state cannot afford anything more than that)
iii. Imitation/Emulation
iv. Satisfying the international community and pacifying their concern regarding proliferation

Why ‘credible’?
i. Psychological comfort
ii. Adds ambiguity
iii. Provides leverage to move towards arms build-up
iv. Imitation

CMD as Pakistani nuclear policy: Tracing its history and identifying the causes
While deterrence has been an integral part of Pakistan’s nuclear policy since its inception, ‘minimum’ and ‘credible’ entered Pakistan’s nuclear lexicon a little later. These two terms were endorsed in February 1999 in the then prepared (publicly unannounced) Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan. (Interview with Brigadier (Retd.) Naeem Salik, 28 January 2011). The initial enthusiasm for minimum deterrence was essentially a consequence of Pakistan’s economic condition with a well-pronounced conviction to keep the arsenal low in numbers.

The question remains, why was there a need to add an additional qualifier (i.e. credible) to 'Minimum Deterrence'? Brig (Retd.) Naeem Salik stated that this was done in order to have the psychological comfort of knowing that Pakistan was not dependent on a bare minimum that poses the challenge of having to lower the nuclear threshold.

Interestingly, one finds a number of occasions where 'minimum' or 'credible' were either replaced with some alternative 'qualifier' (e.g. defensive) or taken out altogether from public speeches made by the country’s top leadership. 

If anything, it illustrates that the issue of understanding Pakistan’s nuclear lexicon is complex. It also suggests that quite often we might attribute too much to the rather less thought out choice of terms. It is less because these terms are used as disguises or are intentionally misleading, more because hardly any attention has been paid to the idea of developing nuclear jargon. There is no evidence that suggests open sessions of discussions and deliberations purely dealing with the question of a lexicon. Few would, for instance, have an answer to why we opted for the word 'credible' or why President Musharraf’s idea of 'defensive' deterrence did not receive a huge following.

Pakistani Perspective of CMD
It has been reiterated time and again that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to deter security threats posed by India. It is clear that threats to the very survival of the state would invoke the need to use nuclear weapons. Ambiguity nonetheless remains on what exactly would be the nature of ‘other’ threats that could compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. Red lines, defined by General Kidwai in one of his interviews, have been quoted and misquoted repeatedly. These lines leave many more confused than clear. It seems that there is a conscious effort to maintain existing ambiguity. Policy-makers in Pakistan feel convinced that this ambiguity serves deterrence well. Therefore, at this point in time, it is hard to move further on this question.

Next is the issue of prefixes. 'Minimum' Deterrence in Pakistan is largely seen as a dynamic concept. The then Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, while speaking at a seminar in November 1999 at ISSI, Islamabad, elaborated, “Minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian build up would necessitate review and reassessment….but we shall not engage in any nuclear competition or arms race.” Some however find mere 'minimum' a little disturbing. They suggest that 'minimum' may not fully serve the purpose at times of an adversary’s nuclear build-up. It might send the wrong signal and develop within the enemy over-confidence and a temptation to opt for aggression. Credible would in such circumstances help keep a psychological check on the adversary. Also, it would provide the protagonist an additional cushion of comfort. [Interview: Brig (Retd.) Salik]

A natural question that follows is how then is the Pakistani idea of CMD different from India’s CMD? Brig (Retd.) Salik asserted that the objective of Pakistan’s CMD posture is very clear and specific, i.e. vis-à-vis India. Therefore it inherently has a limitation. On the contrary, India’s CMD is an open-ended concept!

The point to note is that given these perceptions, would CMD, even in theory, remain a part of India-Pakistan nuclear policies over a long period of time or would it get washed away in the currents of mistrust, antagonism and sometimes over-emphasis on the technical details of deterrence?

Recently, a marked departure has been noted in a public pronouncement of Pakistani nuclear policy, from 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' to 'Credible Deterrence' (NCA Statement, 14 December 2010). The question was raised in two different forums and the speakers held contradictory positions. One speaker argued that it appears to reflect a shift in Pakistan’s policy based on its current threat assessment. A senior government official, on the contrary, suggested that it was used in a given context and should be understood with reference to the complete statement issued by NCA. The emphasis on the word 'credible' was meant to reinforce the importance of credibility. It does not suggest a shift from Minimum Deterrence.

[Deletedid1]

TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON - III: COLD START

Ali Ahmed
Research Fellow, IDSA
email: [email protected]

The Army Chief wrote the epitaph on Cold Start, stating, “There is nothing called ‘Cold Start’.” But it must be acknowledged that in its short shelf life of seven years it had spawned a cottage industry of commentators on it. Like the proverbial ‘blind men of Hindoostan’, they inspected Cold Start and found it viable or otherwise, depending on their avian nature as hawks or doves.

That Cold Start is no more is to be mourned since it did enliven strategic commentary, helped create a strategic culture and brought the Indian political and security establishment to see the military, finally, as a potentially usable instrument. Yet, that the doctrine remained untested owes to India’s grand strategy, characterized lately as ‘strategic restraint’. Strategic restraint is a coming to terms with limitations of force, brought on by things such as the economy and the nuclear backdrop.

The term ‘Cold Start’ for India’s conventional doctrine was conjured up in a media briefing by a ‘source’ on the sidelines of the Army Commander’s conference in the summer of 2004. The doctrine had been discussed in that conference but was adopted in the next conference in autumn that year. It was a culmination of the changes in the Army brought on by the lessons of the two preceding crises, the Limited War in Kargil and the subsequent exercise in coercive diplomacy, Operation Parakram.

Incidentally, even as military analysts made their careers dissecting it, the government in the form of the Ministry of Defence, took care never to refer to it. This suggests that it was a legacy of the previous government, with an image of being more defence-friendly. The NDA dispensation had taken care to bring out the nuclear doctrine while in power, tying India down to its expansive formulation of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation against India or its forces ‘anywhere’. The threat was to create the space necessary to operationalize a proactive conventional war doctrine.

‘Cold Start’ was a limiting description of the doctrine. Cold Start refers only to the kind of capability the Army gave itself, of going into conventional operations from a standing start. This owed to its embarrassment in having taken three weeks to mobilize after the parliament attack, thereby seemingly losing an opportunity to administer punishment and thereby instill caution in Pakistan.

The doctrine envisaged a series of limited thrusts across a wide front into Pakistan by divisional sized forces. These served to capture territory, seize the initiative and provide a launch pad for strike corps to deepen the penetration. Enemy reserves would thus be forced to react and expend themselves. Attrition from the air would enable whittling down the Pakistani Army, seen as the center of gravity. The Army, suitably degraded, would be displaced from power post-conflict in Pakistan, enabling a democratic peace to ensue unlike the last time round post 1971.

The doctrine had much to recommend it. It brought India’s military advantage back into the reckoning despite nuclearization. It enabled taking the first tier of defences when they were unheld or relatively underdeveloped. This would have saved India from casualties, particularly in the mountains. This would have helped prevent the development of an attrition match as had occurred in the earlier wars. It would be a war fought on Pakistani territory, thus sparing India of the effects of the increasing lethality of war. Making early gains, India could call for early war termination on its terms. Since the nuclear threshold was to be respected, there would be no call for Pakistan to resort to nuclear weapons. 

Nevertheless, the doctrine had its criticism. It was seen as narrowing the opportunity for crisis management and conflict avoidance through diplomacy. It would set South Asia a short fuse vulnerable to any passing bunch of self-interested jihadis. A default military reaction in real time would place the two states at odds with each other, playing into the hands of non-state actors who would expect to gain from the resulting instability in Pakistan.

It was deemed to be too deterministic about the location of the Pakistani nuclear threshold. It was taken as high, enabling operations to a limited depth. This was to be unmindful of the influence of a conflict environment on decision-making. It was politically naïve in its belief that knocking down the Pakistani Army would result in democratic forces prevailing. The jihadis could instead have come to the fore. This could be due to Pakistan using them in an Iraqi style asymmetric war against Indian conventional forces in Pakistani territory. Lastly, it was seen as part of the inter-Service rivalry, with the Army trying to set the agenda as the lead service, in reply to the Air Force’s intent of an ‘air alone’ strategy in an indigenous version of ‘Shock and Awe’.

The Cold Start period was India’s third doctrinal tumult. The first was a defensive one subsequent to the 1962 and the 1965 Wars in which the lessons of Ichogil canal were replicated across the front. The second was one of mechanized warfare, led by Sundarji. Cold Start therefore was long over due, since the Sundarji doctrine had been overtaken by overt nuclearization.

Thinking beyond the limitations of Cold Start is the direction of India’s fourth and forthcoming doctrinal tryst. Cold Start can be expected to be reckoned in history as a necessary bridge between India’s war-waging and war-deterring military.

[katharnak]

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[htnamus]

ninnane vesau kadaaa ee article  sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink

[Deletedid1]

[quote author=HS link=topic=156582.msg1856799#msg1856799 date=1297885081]
ninnane vesau kadaaa ee article  sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink sCo_hmmthink
[/quote]

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[htnamus]

[quote author=BENZBABU link=topic=156582.msg1856801#msg1856801 date=1297885176]
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[/quote]ok

[The QUEEN]

[quote author=BENZBABU link=topic=156582.msg1856792#msg1856792 date=1297884901]
[b]TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON - II: CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETERRENCE[/b]

Sadia Tasleem
Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
email: [email protected]

Credible Minimum Deterrence is a highly loaded term, often used to suggest a state’s intentions with regard to its nuclear posture. Combined, the three words, ‘Credible’, ‘Minimum’ and ‘Deterrence’ present a complex paradox. Credibility, for instance, is an essential prerequisite for deterrence. Why then use the word 'credible' as a prefix to Deterrence or Minimum Deterrence?

Yet, another challenge arises from the apparently convoluted nature of messages that 'credible' and 'minimum' convey. While ‘minimum’ suggests “the least required to deter the adversary;” adding 'credible' to it blurs the whole idea. Since credibility largely depends upon the adversary’s perception of our capabilities and intentions, there is always the possibility of incorrectly assessing our credibility in the adversary’s calculations. Caution in such circumstances may necessitate preparation for the worst possible scenario, thus raising the ‘minimum’ bar. As a result what would appear credible might not be ‘minimum’.

Why do then states opt to use terms that send across obscure signals? What shapes their particular choice of terms? And what do they actually mean by these terms? These are important questions to be addressed while we strive to untangle the complexities of a common lexicon. This paper attempts to explain possible causes behind the idea of prefixing both ‘minimum’ and ‘credible’ to deterrence. (Identifying the right causes for a state might also help us clearly define what a state means by minimum and credible).

Why ‘minimum’?
i. To set a ceiling out of sheer sense of moral responsibility
ii. A genuine commitment to keep the arsenal low (either because it is cost-  effective or because a state cannot afford anything more than that)
iii. Imitation/Emulation
iv. Satisfying the international community and pacifying their concern regarding proliferation

Why ‘credible’?
i. Psychological comfort
ii. Adds ambiguity
iii. Provides leverage to move towards arms build-up
iv. Imitation

CMD as Pakistani nuclear policy: Tracing its history and identifying the causes
While deterrence has been an integral part of Pakistan’s nuclear policy since its inception, ‘minimum’ and ‘credible’ entered Pakistan’s nuclear lexicon a little later. These two terms were endorsed in February 1999 in the then prepared (publicly unannounced) Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan. (Interview with Brigadier (Retd.) Naeem Salik, 28 January 2011). The initial enthusiasm for minimum deterrence was essentially a consequence of Pakistan’s economic condition with a well-pronounced conviction to keep the arsenal low in numbers.

The question remains, why was there a need to add an additional qualifier (i.e. credible) to 'Minimum Deterrence'? Brig (Retd.) Naeem Salik stated that this was done in order to have the psychological comfort of knowing that Pakistan was not dependent on a bare minimum that poses the challenge of having to lower the nuclear threshold.

Interestingly, one finds a number of occasions where 'minimum' or 'credible' were either replaced with some alternative 'qualifier' (e.g. defensive) or taken out altogether from public speeches made by the country’s top leadership. 

If anything, it illustrates that the issue of understanding Pakistan’s nuclear lexicon is complex. It also suggests that quite often we might attribute too much to the rather less thought out choice of terms. It is less because these terms are used as disguises or are intentionally misleading, more because hardly any attention has been paid to the idea of developing nuclear jargon. There is no evidence that suggests open sessions of discussions and deliberations purely dealing with the question of a lexicon. Few would, for instance, have an answer to why we opted for the word 'credible' or why President Musharraf’s idea of 'defensive' deterrence did not receive a huge following.

Pakistani Perspective of CMD
It has been reiterated time and again that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to deter security threats posed by India. It is clear that threats to the very survival of the state would invoke the need to use nuclear weapons. Ambiguity nonetheless remains on what exactly would be the nature of ‘other’ threats that could compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. Red lines, defined by General Kidwai in one of his interviews, have been quoted and misquoted repeatedly. These lines leave many more confused than clear. It seems that there is a conscious effort to maintain existing ambiguity. Policy-makers in Pakistan feel convinced that this ambiguity serves deterrence well. Therefore, at this point in time, it is hard to move further on this question.

Next is the issue of prefixes. 'Minimum' Deterrence in Pakistan is largely seen as a dynamic concept. The then Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, while speaking at a seminar in November 1999 at ISSI, Islamabad, elaborated, “Minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian build up would necessitate review and reassessment….but we shall not engage in any nuclear competition or arms race.” Some however find mere 'minimum' a little disturbing. They suggest that 'minimum' may not fully serve the purpose at times of an adversary’s nuclear build-up. It might send the wrong signal and develop within the enemy over-confidence and a temptation to opt for aggression. Credible would in such circumstances help keep a psychological check on the adversary. Also, it would provide the protagonist an additional cushion of comfort. [Interview: Brig (Retd.) Salik]

A natural question that follows is how then is the Pakistani idea of CMD different from India’s CMD? Brig (Retd.) Salik asserted that the objective of Pakistan’s CMD posture is very clear and specific, i.e. vis-à-vis India. Therefore it inherently has a limitation. On the contrary, India’s CMD is an open-ended concept!

The point to note is that given these perceptions, would CMD, even in theory, remain a part of India-Pakistan nuclear policies over a long period of time or would it get washed away in the currents of mistrust, antagonism and sometimes over-emphasis on the technical details of deterrence?

Recently, a marked departure has been noted in a public pronouncement of Pakistani nuclear policy, from 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' to 'Credible Deterrence' (NCA Statement, 14 December 2010). The question was raised in two different forums and the speakers held contradictory positions. One speaker argued that it appears to reflect a shift in Pakistan’s policy based on its current threat assessment. A senior government official, on the contrary, suggested that it was used in a given context and should be understood with reference to the complete statement issued by NCA. The emphasis on the word 'credible' was meant to reinforce the importance of credibility. It does not suggest a shift from Minimum Deterrence.
[/quote]

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