Move towards jointness of Armed forces

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Jointness in the armed forces has been the buzz word for a long time. The Arjun Singh committee report, also known as the Group of Ministers Report (GoM), at the end of the Kargil war was probably the first time the Government of India (GoI) realised the dire need of joint operations in the future and therefore joint training in the armed forces. It was the first official report which articulated the need for synergy in training and operations of the three services. As a consequence, India’s first joint headquarter was formed, called the Integrated Defence Staff Headquarter (IDS), albeit with a very limited mandate. The report recommended the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a Five Star General, who would be the single point contact for all military advice to the GoI.Successive governments, weak kneed due to lack of clarity on defence matters, have not implemented the recommendations of the GoM report in announcing the appointment of the CDS. As an consequence of the lack of a CDS, even IDS headquarter has not given much thought to implementing the GoMs report recommendations, which besides advocating major reforms at the GoI level also gave a host of recommendations to be actioned at the armed forces level. Most of these related to joint training.


Why has the GoI not appointed the CDS? Two reasons are doing the rounds. First is the scare in the civil domain that vesting all military power in the hands of a single individual, the CDS, could lead to him becoming a threat to the elected government, probably based on the happenings in our neighbourhood. This, as any armed forces individual will bear out, is sheer ignorance. The Indian armed forces are amongst the most apolitical force in the world. There is respect in the armed forces for the elected representatives. However the bureaucrats continue to use this as an argument to convince the politicians to ensure that a CDS is not appointed. The second argument is more plausible. This relates to the worry of the officials of losing their power over the armed forces. If the CDS is created, being a Five Star General, he would be senior to the Defence and the Cabinet Secretary. He would be the single point for advice on military matters to the GoI. The Defence Secretary would be bypassed. These officials would not be able to provide the GoI ‘doctored’ advice on service matters. Now the GoI would get the authentic views of the armed forces from the CDS. The appointing of a CDS will change in the Order of Precedence, with the CDS ranking higher than the Cabinet Secretary. Strong reasons for the beaucracy for not advising the GoI on appointing a CDS.


Both these reasons and arguments negate the very concept of jointness that was advocated by the Arjun Singh Committee. More clearly it shows that the bureaucrat will not recommend to the Defence Minister that ‘all’ recommendations of the GoM report should be completed. These recommendations should have been completed many years ago. Here the services are also at fault. Minor recommendations of the report were to be completed by the service headquarter. The responsibility was entrusted to the IDS headquarter. The IDS headquarter has on many occasions been driving the service headquarter on completing the GoM recommendations. This is however always negated by the service headquarter on some pretext or the other, mostly on incompatibility in the methods of training of each service. Untenable reasons of course.


There are three important Joint Training Institutes in the armed forces. The Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), College of Defence Management and the National Defence Academy (NDA). This excludes the National Defence College which the MoD keeps under its control. The DSSC has a wonderful reputation worldwide of being a professional college. However a closer look at its curriculum will reveal that the amount of actual ‘Joint Training’ conducted is less than 50%. The CDM, while a good educational institute, does not find favour with most officers as it takes them away from their primary role of being military officers and military training. Thus most CDM courses are under subscribed. If it gets a full strength, a large segment of officers have been ‘sent’ for the course without a choice. The joint training at NDA has stood the test of time. Many developed countries are envious of the type of training imparted at the NDA. Today, if there is an iota of jointness in the services, it can be traced back to the old NDA ties and training more than any other reason. Unfortunately, even at the NDA one service is trying to pull out its cadets as it feels that its cadets need to be more educated. Defacto it wants to undo all that has sustained jointness in the services over the last 60 years. Needless to say that all wars in future will have to be fought jointly. Despite the increase in individual service capabilities and arsenal, unless this is put to effect jointly it will not give us the bang for the buck. If this capability is retained within the individual service it may be the cause of losing the next war. The readers of this article should not go away thinking that since there is no jointness within the services all is lost. It is indeed heartening that at the ‘operational’ level there is a large amount of jointness. Joint plans for the prosecution of war and operations are in place. However these are personality based. They stem from the old NDA ties. While this has the tactic nod from the services headquarter the joint plans still do not have a formal approval.


How then can we ensure jointness in the armed forces? Nothing new, everybody talks of a top down approach. Which implies that the services have not been able to get their act together? Let the GoI lay down the norms for joint operations and joint training. How will this get done when the concerned officials in the MoD do not have even the basic knowledge of the requirements of the services? Fortunately there are many qualified veterans who have distinguished themselves in joint services establishments including holding the appointment of the CISCs at IDS headquarter. There are many think tanks that can be tasked to put together a working plan and be appointed as advisors to the Defence Minister, much like the National Advisory Council of the UPA chairperson. Shouldn’t be too difficult. Simultaneously appoint a CDS. But does the GoI have the will? The armed forces are so apolitical that the dread of a coup should be firmly put aside. Empower the CDS to develop joint plans for operations and training for the immediate contingencies. Provide him with a planning staff


Some also believe that the jointness process must start with the integration of MoD with the services headquarter, rather this jointness be based on semantics as at present. One cannot dismiss the idea for the MoD and services headquarter integration should be the final outcome if jointness is to be sustained. But before the MoD and services headquarter integration takes place, the GoI can and should dictate jointers at the service headquarter level, followed by joint manning of the command headquarter. Let it not continue in the present manner where minimal interservice manning at the service and command headquarter provides the crucial link, that to without the associated authority to make a commitment.


With large inductions of new weapon systems over the next 10 – 15 years, each service will be busy training its manpower on the new equipment and operationalising its forces. The task of war planning should be entrusted to the CDS. The time is ripe for such a transition. If the GoI delays it now, this opportunity will not present itself again with such ideal conditions for harnessing the capabilities of joint operations for the future. The services will benefit as will the nation.