India's Defense Postures In Ladakh: A Wake Up Call

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China positioning itself as a substantive strategic stakeholder in the Northern Territories of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir introduces a complicating and threatening element to India's defense postures in Ladakh.  My last SAAG paper no. 4036 dated 13 Sept 2010 "China's Obtrusive Presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Implications For India And United States" ([url=http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4036.html]http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4036.html[/url]) has examined in fair detail as to how this development changes the military equations in this sector with a greater integration of Chinese and Pakistan military capabilities opposite the Ladakh Sector of the Indian Army.

The Indian Army has always had the strategic vision of anticipating a collusive and combined China-Pakistan military threat and prepared contingency plans to deal with such a threat irrespective of the peace rhetoric that flows politically between New Delhi and Islamabad and New Delhi and Beijing.

However, what needs to be emphasized is that contingency plans do not suffice to meet potent military threats from India's confirmed military adversaries-confirmed military adversaries as both China and Pakistan have at different times engaged in aggressive armed conflicts against India. India's political leadership has to timely provide the military assets to add muscle to these Indian Army's contingency plans in terms of military hardware, additional military manpower, logistics backup and infrastructural developments to meet a collusive China-Pakistan military threat.

Devoid of any inside insights to India's military planning or access to classified information on India's defense postures, as a strategic analyst with decades of experience in this field, one can assert that Indian Army's defense postures presently in Ladakh are sound only in terms of minimal defensive deployments to "defend" Ladakh.

India's defense postures in Ladakh, however, cannot be assessed as forcefully strong in terms of imposing dissuasion or generating "effective military deterrence" on China and Pakistan not to entertain any aggressive designs against the Ladakh Sector.

The Indian Government needs to "speed-track" the build-up of Indian Army defense postures in Ladakh to the level of "effective military deterrence" to deter China and Pakistan from military adventurism against the Ladakh Sector. This becomes a pressing military imperative in view of enhancement of China's and Pakistan's military capabilities overall against India and China's emergence as a substantive stakeholder in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Additionally, the point that needs to be made is that India's war preparedness does not seem to have kept pace with the upgradation of Chinese and Pakistani military capabilities that both can bring to bear against India. In the Indian policy establishment at the apex level there are many "China Hands" with first hand experience in dealing with the Chinese policy establishment. Surely they cannot be unaware of what China and Pakistan are upto. Surely too, they can prevail in fast tracking India's war preparedness to start matching the strategic infrastructure upgradation of Chinese and Pakistani military buildups to apply their enhanced military capabilities against India.

Ladakh presently demands additional focus as the pattern of China's military incursions and transgressions into Indian territory in the last two or three years as highlighted by the media, both electronic and print, points indicators towards China's military intentions in this region. That China could with impunity ingress into Indian territory indicates that our force-levels in Ladakh are inadequate to deter China from doing so and need to be reinforced.

Imperatives for stronger defense postures get further reinforced by China emerging as an obtrusive stakeholder in Pakistan's Northern Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan.

This Paper intends a review of India's defense postures in Ladakh and what needs to be done to achieve "effective military deterrence" against any possible aggressive designs by China and Pakistan, under the following heads:



Indian Military Postures in Ladakh: Minimal Not Deterrent


China's Strong Military Determinants for a Major Offensive Against Ladakh


India's Deterrent Defensive Posture in Ladakh: Recommendations

Indian Military Postures in Ladakh: Minimal Not Deterrent

For the purposes of discussion in this Paper, the Ladakh Sector is considered as the entire stretch of Indian territory from Zojila to Ladakh's borders with Himachal Pradesh This stretch initially in the Kargil Sector borders Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and thereafter China all the way along. This also includes the vital Siachin Sector again blocking ingress routes from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to Ladakh.

Also required to be emphasized once again is the fact that all Indian Army deployments mentioned here are entirely based on media reports and published books available in the public domain.

The defense of Ladakh from 1947 till about 1959 was dismally ignored by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as according to him "not even a blade of grass grows there"

And for years he held back from the Parliament that China had annexed a sizeable chunk of Indian territory in Aksai Chin.

From 1959 till just short of the full fledged Chinese invasion of Ladakh, India's political leadership incrementally deployed initially the CRPF, then two J&K Militia Battalions, and on the verge of 1962 created at first a Brigade and later a Division for the defense of Ladakh. In addition there was an Independent Infantry Brigade positioned at Kargil sometime in the same period.

This pattern continued till the Kargil War started By Pakistan in 1999, except that a Brigade was inducted in Siachin Sector in the mid-1980s when Pakistan incursions in this area were discovered.

The inadequacy of Indian defense postures in Kargil area were brought home by the Kargil War with Pakistan's underlying intentions to cut the only lifeline from Srinagar to Leh and resulting in the deployment of a Division for defense of this sector.

In overall effect, Indian Army's defense postures in Ladakh Sector are minimal with a Division defending against Pakistan and a Division defending the Ladakh area of the Ladakh Sector. Media reports do not indicate any additional Indian Army deployments in this vital Sector. So far all practical purposes in the Ladakh area of the Ladakh Sector, there is only one Division, a deployment that is constant from 1962 onwards. 

So while the Pakistan threat may have been catered for after the Kargil War with a divisional deployment, India has yet to reinforce Ladakh against the magnifying China threat against Ladakh. 

This is a "minimal defense posture" whereas Ladakh contextually needs a defense posture of "effective military deterrence" to foil China's and Pakistan's aggressive military designs.

China's Strong Military Determinants for a Major Offensive Against Ladakh

In the 1962 military offensive against India, China's main military thrusts were focused on two different ends of the India-Occupied Tibet border, namely against Ladakh and in Arunachal Pradesh against Tawang Sector of Arunachal Pradesh. China did not focus against the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border and the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border.

In any future Chinese military aggression against India, with improved strategic infrastructure in Tibet, China will still focus on Ladakh and Tawang Sectors but also carry out sizeable thrusts opposite Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh to divide four-fold India's military responses against Chinese aggression.

However, China would have a complex task of prioritizing its military plans in relation to Ladakh and Tawang Sectors as to  where should the overwhelming Chinese military offensive priority be applied. In my assessment, China with a capability to deploy nearly forty Chinese Military Divisions against India in a short time frame with her improved infrastructural developments would apply massive strengths against both Ladakh and Tawang Sectors. Still, China has stronger military determinants to unravel India's defense postures in the Ladakh Sector.

China's strong military determinants for a major military offensive against Ladakh Sector in a future conflict can be briefly recounted as under:

India in recent times has adopted strong military postures in the Tawang Sector with additional two Infantry Divisions and possibly independent infantry brigades. China would have a difficult time in a cake-walk through this Sector as it did in 1962.
Additionally, China cannot expect any Pakistan Army collusive military operations to divide Indian military focus in the Eastern Sector.
China's better military option would be to unravel Indian Army defensive postures in Ladakh Sector where Chinese military offensives can be collusively supported and supplemented by Pakistan Army military offensives against Kargil, Siachin and all along the LOC in Kashmir robbing Indian Army of any strategic reserves against China
China's military hold on the restive Muslim majority region of Xingjian is dependant on the crucial Aksai Chin Road traversing Chinese Occupied Region of Aksai Chin
The Southern Sector of India's Ladakh Sector is perilously close to the Aksai Chin Road and China is aware of it. If India had the strategic audacity and creates sizeable military assets it could pose an existential threat to the Aksai Chin Road and affect China's hold over Xingjian Region.
Similarly in the Ladakh Sector, the Western Regions of China Occupied Tibet offer greater options for any offensives that India may dare for two simple reasons. The first being that despite any military advantages that China may have created in recent times, China would still have to mount operations based on extended lines of communications vulnerable to any future use of Indian Air Force in a future conflict. Secondly, in a conflictual situation the Uighur independence movement in Xingjian may be tempted to shake-off the Chinese occupation over Xingjian.

It is therefore no surprise to any strategic analyst that China insists forcefully in negotiations with India that India should barter the Aksai Chin Region in lieu of Arunachal Pradesh which China has lately been in the habit of terming as Southern Tibet.

India's Deterrent Defensive Postures in Ladakh: Recommendations

The following recommendations would be in order keeping India's current minimal defensive deployments in Ladakh Sector, China's military determinants for a major offensive against Ladakh Sector and the adoption of "effective military deterrence" defensive postures in Ladakh Sector:

Ladakh alone, excluding the Kargil area needs two Infantry Divisions for defensive deployments to cover the two main offensive routes available to China.
Additionally, Ladakh alone requires one Infantry Division as reserve for contingency operations.
One additional Independent Infantry Brigade Group is required for the Kargil area to cater for increased Pakistan Army propensities to supplement Chinese offensive against Ladakh Sector.
One Mechanized Brigade  with two armored regiments and two mechanized infantry Battalions are required to be appropriately deployed at Chushul and Demchok
One Heliborne Operations Brigade for offensive tasks needs to be positioned at Leh
Two heavy-lift utility helicopter squadrons need to be positioned at Leh for logistics support purposes
The Indian Air Force transport aircraft fleet will need expansion and modernization as India's defense postures would be logistically reliant on aerial resupply for logistics purpose for some more time

Any "effective military deterrent" defensive posture would be incomplete without creating offensive capabilities. Logistically, it may not be possible to maintain offensive military operations assets within Ladakh Sector and hence would need to be created at Northern Command level but with dedicated roles in the Ladakh Sector.

One is intrigued as to why the Ladakh Scouts were converted into a regular infantry regiment. They should be reverted back to the Ladakh Scouts role and wholly be deployed in Ladakh Sector only. They played an effective operational role in the 1971 War and the Kargil War. The Ladakh Scouts are ideal for irregular warfare both in disrupting any Chinese offensives and also for Special Operations behind Chinese lines.

In the same vein one would like to offer a recommendation of enlisting Tibetans in India for Special Forces tasks during military operations by China. They would be a valuable asset for any military commander in the Ladakh Sector. Politically, this might not be acceptable to the Government but then when has China been respectful of Indian political and strategic sensitivities.

The crucial and inescapable imperative for building up our defense postures in the Ladakh Sector would be the speedy build-up of logistics infrastructure to sustain enhanced military force deployments. If China could build a railway line at forbidding heights and gas pipelines to Tibet what stops the Indian Government from developing the same to Ladakh on a war-footing.

One has deliberately not touched on the aspect of Indian Air Force roles and neutralizing Chinese deployments of nuclear ballistic missiles in Tibet as they are planned on an overall threat profile and cannot be confined to Ladakh Sector only. But it needs to be strongly emphasized that the Indian Government should not trifle in placing the AGNI-IV Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) at the disposal of the Indian Armed Forces.

Operational deployment of the AGNI-IV ICBM is both a political and strategic imperative, long overdue.

Concluding Observations

"The China Threat to India is Real" should be accepted as a cardinal policy precept by the Indian policy establishment. India's political leadership whilst planning and putting into effect India's defense postures against China need to bear in mind Nehru's Himalayan blunders and not repeat the same.

Indian political leaders cannot be dismissive of the China Threat to India solely relying on their "political intentions readings of China". That was where Nehru went wrong and exposed the Indian Army to a humiliating military debacle because under his leadership the Indian Army was not provided with the sinews of war necessary to effectively combat China. It is not surprising that successive Indian political leaders have shied away from authorizing the release of the Henderson-Brookes Inquiry Report on the 1962 Debacle into the public domain.

India's political leadership would be well-advised to speed-track the creation of an "effective military deterrent" defensive posture in the Ladakh Sector to pre-empt China's aggressive designs in this Sector in view of the contextual changes underway of a greater strategic and military collusiveness between China and Pakistan opposite this Sector.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst.  He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group.  Email: [email protected])

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