Gang of seven Pakistan armymen behind 26/11: Headley

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Twenty-one people plotted 26/11, including four serving officers of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and three ex-officers of the Pakistani Army, David Coleman Headley has said in a 109-page interrogation report prepared by the National Investigative Agency (NIA).

Of the serving ISI officers Headley named, Major Sameer Ali and Major Iqbal were already cited in a dossier sent by India to Pakistan earlier this year. Headley has now named two more: Lt-Colonel Hamza and Colonel Shah.

"The LeT (Lashkar-e-Tayyeba) chief, Hafiz Saeed, is very close to the ISI," the report quotes Headley as saying. "The chief commander of the LeT, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, is close to the directorgeneral of the ISI. ISI officers have profound influence and great control over the top brass of the LeT."

Headley also confessed that he separately briefed his ISI handler, Major Iqbal, after every reconnaissance visit to Mumbai. "I carried out certain exclusive reconnaissance tasks for my ISI handlers," Headley says. "Every important member of the LeT is handled by one or more ISI officers. Hafiz Saeed is diplomatic and never talks directly. I have shown you his house on the Google Earth map. He is well-protected. Without his
approval, 26/11 could not have happened."

Headley spoke for 34 hours from June 3 to June 9 this year in Chicago to a team of the National Investigation Agency (NIA). However, India has no independent corroboration from either the US or Pakistan if these names are for real. In the report, Headley says Major Sameer Ali, Major Iqbal, Lt-Col
Hamza and Col Shah were central to the 26/11 plot. He describes these men and his first meeting with them in Lahore.

"Major Iqbal is in his mid-30s, 5'9", fat, with a moustache, a big head, thick hair and a deep voice," Headley says. "He smokes cigarettes. In the first meeting, he introduced me to his boss, Lt-Col Hamza, who was in his early 40s, 5'6", baby-faced and also overweight by army standards. He appeared to
be from Punjab. This I could guess from his accent. They listened to my entire plan to attack India for more than two hours."

Headley spoke at length about retired Pakistani Army Major Abdur Rehman alias Pasha and a key LeT man, Sajid Majid, who Headley claims has undergone plastic surgery to hide his true identity.

Last week, India got Interpol to issue Red Corner Notices (RCNs) against both Rehman and Majid. Headley says both these men were in India in April 2005 and had recced the National Defence College (NDC) in Delhi and the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in Dehradun. This was after the LeT attacked bus services in Muzaffarabad and Srinagar.

"They went under the pretext of watching an Indo-Pak cricket match," Headley reveals. "They went from the Wagah border. Rehman went to the NDC for the recce… both had possibly gone to the IMA. Rehman recalled to me that Sajid was very nervous at the Wagah Gate on their way back."

Headley says Rehman was a hardened jihadi who retired as a Major from the 6 Baloch Regiment of the Pakistan army and was in direct touch with the al-Qaeda top brass. Rehman quit the army after refusing to fight the Taliban in Tora Bora in 2002. He later trained an LeT suicide squad to carry out attacks in India while Headley was training with the terror group in 2003.

"Around 2004, the Indian PM's rally was attacked in Srinagar by the LeT. This attack was carried out by one of the trainees of Rehman," Headley says, identifying this particular attacker.

Headley, who was born Daoud Gilani to a Pakistani-American father and an American mother but later changed it to David Coleman Headley to avoid racial profiling at US airports, says Hamza assured him of financial help for the 26/11 mission. "(Hamza) directed me to follow the directions of Major Iqbal from time to time and inform the Major about all my activities," he is quoted in the report as saying.

In March 2006, on the streets of Lahore, Iqbal trained him in clandestine photography and spycraft. This was after Headley had completed his LeT training. "I became close to Major Iqbal as I found him professional in his approach," he says. "Major Iqbal taught me the basics of Intelligence… this included several lessons, such as how to create sources, how to take cover and so on. After explaining the theory, he would take me to the streets of Lahore to execute them. His training was much more scientific and effective than the trainings I did in LeT camps. I truly enjoyed this training."

Two other Pakistani ex-army officers and brothers -- Major Haroon and Major Khurram, from 10 Punjab and 6 Baloch regiments of the Pakistan army respectively -- were also trainers for the LeT, Headley says. Headley also identified Sajid Majid, from the transcripts recorded during the 26/11 attack, as the person directing terrorists on the phone to kill all, including women, at Nariman House in Mumbai. He says Sajid showed him a number of CDs of atrocities on Indian Muslims, including videos of Gujarat Bajrang Dal leader Babu Bajrangi shot during the Gujarat riots of 2002.

Headley speaks of two other important and senior LeT operatives -- Muzzammil and Abu Dujana. He claims Muzzammil was behind the Chattisinghpora massacre in March 2000, when 34 Sikhs were assembled and shot dead in the village gurudwara by militants dressed in Indian Army fatigues. Headley claims Muzzammil also planned the Akshardham temple attack in Gujarat in September 2002.

Headley also identified the voices of Abu Qahafa and Abu Hamza, besides Sajid Majid, as those directing the 26/11 terrorists on the phone.

Headley gave NIA details of LeT and ISI safe-houses and also LeT's operational camps. Using Google Earth, he pointed out a couple of LeT safe-houses in Rawalpindi, along with the houses of LeT founder Hafiz Saeed and Abdur Rehman, in addition to his own.